TOS.
Det virker for meg som du ikke helt vil annerkjenne disse probleme i bransjen? Har du sett linkene jeg postet?
Her er en icident som skjedde med et Ryanair fly:
Report: Ryanair B738 at Rome on Sep 7th 2005, loss of situational awareness and terrain clearance
The crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-
DAV performing flight FR-9672 from Dusseldorf Niederrhein (Germany) to Rome Ciampino (Italy) with 166 passengers, completely lost situational awareness around 12:20Z, after they had abandoned their approach to Rome's Ciampino Airport and decided to divert to Rome's Fiumicino Airport due to adverse weather. The crew began to miss
ATC instructions and descended below assigned altitudes, getting into conflict with other traffic forced to descend further to 1000 feet, but descending below 1000 feet too and thus getting just about 454 feet above ground at a speed of 200 KIAS perpendicular to the approach path at one point before the crew aborted the approach. The crew was not able to approach Fiumicino as well and finally diverted to Pescara, where the airplane landed safely with just 1520 kg (3350 lbs) of fuel remaining.
The Italian National Agency for Aviation Safety ("Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo", ANSV) concluded in their final report, that the cause of the serious incident was
- the incorrect operation and conduct of flight by the flight crew in adverse weather at the unplanned and unbriefed diversion to Rome's Fiumicino Airport.
Contributing were
- the captain's state of mind, who had lost his only son three months before after a long illness
- the progressing loss of situational awareness by the flight crew
- limited experience by the first officer
- poor cockpit resource management and crew cooperation
- inappropriate informations provided by air traffic control in non-standard language
- inadequate analysis of weather data by the flight crew
- incorrect use of onboard weather radar by flight crew
- absence of timely available ground radar based weather data in the Rome approach sectors
- absence of the minimum safe altitude warning on the approach radar of Rome's air traffic control
The ANSV was informed of the incident through the Irish AAIU (Aviation Accident Investigation Unit) on Jan 13th 2006 only and rated the incident as serious. The investigation was mainly conducted using the radar recordings. Cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders were not available anymore several months after the incident. The information of interest had already been overwritten when the recorders were removed from the airplane on September 9th. The captain of the flight had in fact not tripped the circuit breaker for the recorders as required by company rules
Hva tenker du om en pilot som flyr i dyp sorg? Uerfaren styrmann? Dette er fremtiden du mener er greit, fordi det er slik markedet er.. Ingen
HMS i flybransjen lenger. I et solid selskap hvor kaptienen ikke frykter for sin jobb, ville han kunne sykemeldt seg pga depresjon... Styrmannen ville hatt 1500 flytimer minimum, ikke 200...
Har noen tenkt på at styrmannen skal kunne trygt få flyet ned hvis f.eks kapteinen blir incapasitated? Altså på et Ryanair fly hvis kapteinen blir incapasitated, sitter en jypling med 200 flytimer totalt rett ut av skolen igjen med ansvaret å få 180 mennekser trygt ned på bakken i mulig utfordrende værforhold... er det ikke litt skremmende?
Hørte du om kapteinen som i media kritisert O'leary for å være useriøs når det kommer til dette med kun én pilot i cockpit.. Han fikk mot sin vilje endret sin base til det som kjennetegnes som "sibir basen" i Ryanair...
Hvor mange eksempler må til før vi får et.. "ja, det er tydeligvis noen problemer her som må tas tak i før det går på helsen løs" ?